



Models of money demand generally assume that in the short-run,
actual real balances may diverge from their desired level. This paper
compares two alternative explanations. The first is that the centralbank
fixes the nominal money stock but prices change slowly so that the real
money stock adjusts to its desired level with a lag. The second is that
transactions costs cause individuals to change their nominal money
holdings slowly. Empirical evidence mildly supports the second hypo-
thesis, even during the 1979-82periodwhen the Federal Reserve closely
monitoredthe nominalM1 stock.
Models of money demand generally take it for
grantedthat, in the short-run, the actual stockofreal
money balances may diverge from the "desired
stock" determined by the prevailing levels of
income and interest rates. The standard explanation
for this divergence is that there are "transaction
costs" to adjusting money holdings, which render it
non-optimal for individual transactors to alter their
stocks ofmoney continually to hold them at desired
levels. These transaction costs include not only
such explicit charges as brokerage fees for buying
and selling financial assets but also the psycho-
logical and "shoe-leather" costs of deciding upon
and then implementing a change in average money
holdings.
An alternative reason for expecting diver~Fnces
between actual and desired real balancesl!; that
although individual transactors can increase/or de-
crease their nominal money holdings, the economy
as a whole cannot, as long as the central bank is
controlling the stock of money closely. In other
words, if the Federal Reserve fixes the nominal
stock, money becomes a "hot potato", so that the
desired stock of money must adjust to match the
actual stock rather than conversely. As a result,
divergences between the desired and actual stocks
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may occur not because economic agents are indi-
vidually slow to adjust their actual money holdings
to their desired levels but because the factors deter-
mining those desired holdings-prices, income and
interest rates-do not adjust instantaneously to
close such gaps.
The so-called "buffer-stock" approach to the
demandfor money in a sense lies betweenthese two
views of the adjustment process. According to this
approach, an essential function ofmoney is to serve
as a "buffer" between streams ofreceipts and ex-
penditures, both of which are somewhat unpredic-
table. Thephrase "quantityofmoney demanded...
does not refer to an amount of money which an
(individual economic) agent will want to hold at
each and every moment, but rather, to an amount
which he will want to hold on average over some
time interval." I The agentanticipates that his actual
money holdings will vary around this average, ris-
ing when outlays are unexpectedly low or receipts
are unexpectedly high, and falling when the con-
verse is the case.
Indeed, it is largely because agents anticipate
such variations (that is, they expectthe unexpected)
that they hold stocks ofmoney. 2 As a result, when
money holdings do rise or fall, agents do not
immediately seek to move their holdings back to
their desired average level. This explains why-
even at the level ofthe individual agent-''actual"
money may diverge from "desired"money, and
also why the factors determining the total desiredM,-Pt= (l-I')(M,-PH)
+l'ao+l'a,Yt+l'a2it-u; (3a)
where all variables are in logarithms and m~ repre-
sents the desired stock of real balances given the
levels ofreal income, y" and interest rates, it,
Mt=(l-A)Mt_I-APt+8(l-A)LlBLt
+Aao+Aa,y,+Aa2it+uMt (5)
As in the case of the price-adjustment model, this
equationalso may be written in an alternative form:
(1)
(2)
(Mt- P,) =(1-A)(Mt_1- PI) + 8(1-A)ABLt
+Aao+Aa,y,+Aa2it+uM, (5a)
It is important to note that in Equation (3) the
price level is the dependent variable and the nom-
inal money stock is exogenous, whereas in Equa-
tion (5) nominal money is endogenous and prices
are exogenous. Although the models may be trans-
formed algebraically to appear to have the same
dependent variable, such transformations do not
alter the estimated parameters as long as the appro-
priate coefficient restrictions are imposed. In com-
paring the models, it is important to bear this in
mind, since the variance of prices is substantially
lessthanthe variance ofthe nominal money stock. 4
Substituting Equation (2) into Equation (1) and
adding an errorterm yields
P,=(l-'y) PH +I'M,
-l'ao-l'a,y,-l'a2it+u; (3)
This equation also may be written in an alternative
form:
The Judd-Scadding version ofthe money adjust-
ment model begins with the assumption that the
nominal money stock responds to the difference
between the currently desired money stock and the
actual stock in the preceding period, after adjust-




Substituting Equation (2) into Equation (4) and
adding an error term yields
Alternative ModelsofDynamic Adjustment
The price adjustment model begins with the
assumption that prices change in response to the
difference between the actual money stock deter-
mined by the central bank and the desired stock:
stock-income, prices and interest rates-do not
adjust rapidly to eliminate such divergences.
In a recent article in this Review, Judd and Scad-
ding compared a variety of alternative dynamic
models of money demand.
3 They concluded that
models in which divergences between desired and
actual real balances resulted from slow adjustment
inpricesprovidedthe bestexplanationofU.S. data.
Judd and Scadding used quarterly data and their
estimation period ended in 1974. The purpose of
this short paper is to compare the performance of
this "price-adjustment" model with the conven-
tional approach using monthly data over the period
since mid-1976 and, in particular, to examine
whether changes in the central bank's policy target
have affected the results ofthis comparison.
The use of monthly data raises the issue of
whether the "adjusting variable" may be different
according to the length of time considered. Most
theoretical models assume that, in the short run,
income and prices are essentially fixed and that it is
the interest rate that moves to equate money supply
and money demand. Interest rate changes are then
transmitted to income and prices over a longertime
period. Judd and Scadding found that a model in
which interest rates move in response to divergences
between money supply and money demand was
unable to explain U.S. quarterly data. A possible
explanation for theirresult wouldbe thatthe interest
rate adjustment process is completed within a quar-
ter and so cannot be captured in quarterly data.
However, in preliminarytests, Iobtainedsimilar-
ly poor results using monthly data, casting some
doubt on the standard view that interest rates are the
adjusting variable in the short run. In view ofthese
initial results, I decided to limit this study to
a comparison between the conventional money-
adjustment approach, in which the nominalmoney
supply adjusts to the public's demand for nominal
money balances, andthe price-adjustmentapproach
in which the nominal supply ofmoney is fixed and
prices adjust to equate the real money supply with
the public's demand for real money balances.
23Empirical Results
The results ofestimating Equations (3a) and (Sa)
over the period 1976.08-1983.08 are shown in
Table I. The entries represent the underlying struc-
tural parameters ofthe models: the long-run elastic-
ities with respect to real income andthe interest (ate
[a l and az in Equation (2)] and the adjustment
coefficients (A andy). Itis strikingthat theelasticity
estimates are extremely close. Moreover, both the
income elasticity (not significantly different from
unity) and the interest rate elasticity are close to
estimates made with the SanFranciscoMoney Mar-
ketModel.
5
The standard error ofthe price-adjustment equa-
tion is noticeably lower than that of the money-
adjustment model. This result is the same as that
reached by Judd and Scadding using quarterly data
over an earlier sample period. However, this find-
ing does not necessarily imply that the price-adjust-
ment model.is superior because the variance ofthe
dependent variable also is lowerin the price-adjust-
ment equation. In terms of the proportion of total







Adjustment Factor* 0.038 0.109
(2.760) (3.768)
Real Personal Income 1.110 1.018
(Elasticity) (2.635) (3.958)





(Long RunValue). (0.927) (1.087)
RHO I 0.247 0.186
(2.207) (1.523)





* ')I in Equation (3); Ain Equation (5)
** 8 in Equation (5)
*** Based on monthly growth rates of prices and nominal
money. and adjusted for degreesoffreedom. Seefootnote 6.
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and, in fact, the money-adjustment model provides
a slightly better fit. Allowing for degrees of
freedom, the price model explains 28.5 percent of
total variance while the money model explains 34.4
percent.6
The underlying theory ofthese models suggests
that their appropriateness should depend on the
monetary policy rule being followed by the central
bank. If, for example, the authorities pursue an
interest rate target in the short run, the stock of
nominal money is endogenous and hence the
money-adjustment model is appropriate. With a
money-stock target, on the other hand, money
becomes a "hot-potato," making the price-
adjustment model more appropriate.
To test the idea that the policy rule may influence
the adjustment mechanism, the full sample period
(1976.08-1983.08) was divided into two sub-
samples. In 1979.10-1982.07, the Federal Reserve
was assumed to be fixing the nominal money stock
in the short run; hence the price adjustment model
should be the appropriate one. In 1976.08-1979.09
and 1982.08-1983.08, the Federal Reserve was
assumed to be allowing the nominal money stock to
be endogenous in the short run; hence the money-
adjustment model should be appropriate. Separate
equations wereestimatedfor these twoperiods. The
results are shown in Table 2. The coefficients
shown in the first and second columns ofthe table
are unconstrainedestimates, while those in the third
andfourth columns were made subjecttothe restric-
tion that the underlying long-run income and inter-
est rate elasticities remained constant over the full
1976-83 sample period. This restriction reflects the
assumption that these long-run elasticities do not
depend on the policy regime. Underthis restriction,
the estimated elasticities are not much different
from those estimated in Table I.
The results in Table 2 cast some doubt on the
price-adjustment model. When this model is esti-
mated over the period for which theory suggests it
should be most appropriate (the period from Octo-
ber 1979 to July 1982, during which the Federal
Reserve was targeting MI), the income and interest
rate elasticities are implausibly low. These elasti-
city estimates change dramatically when the con-
straint that they are constant over the full 1976-83
period is imposed
7 [compare columns (I) and (3) ofthe table]. By contrast, the money equation yields
plausible parameters that do not change much when
the restriction is imposed.
I would interpret these results as giving some
supportto the money-adjustment model and casting
some doubt on the price-adjustment model, but the
evidence is not strong either way. One possible
explanation for the results is that although the Fed-
eralReserve targetedMI overthe 1979-82 period, it
did not control it sufficiently closely in the short run
for it to be genuinely exogenous. Even over this
period, then, Mlwas not a true "hot potato."
Anotherexplanationcouldbe thatthe sample period
for the price-adjustmentmodel is shortand includes
highly unusual interest rate and income volatility as
well as a period ofcredit controls.
Summaryand Conclusions
The principal purpose of this paper was to re-
examine the question raised by Judd and Scadding
as to the appropriateness of the conventional as-
sumption in money demand studies that nominal
money demand responds to changes in its deter-
minants (income, prices, interest rates) with a lag.
The alternative view considered here is that the real
money supply adjusts to real demand with a lag
because prices adjust slowly. Judd and Scadding
concluded that the price-adjustment modeloutper-
formed the money-adjustment specification.
I have argued that the appropriate specification,
in principle, depends onthe policy regime in effect.
Ifthe central bank is pursuing a nominal MI target,
money becomes a "hot potato" and the conven-
tional specification in which nominal money is the
adjusting variable will not be appropriate. Such a
specification would be suitable if the Federal Re-
serve had an interest rate or nominal income target
and, in the short run, allowed the nominal supplyof
money to adjust in response to changes in demand.
I also argue that it is not appropriate to compare
these models in terms ofthe standard errors of the
estimated equations under the rival specifications.
Under the conventional specification, the depen-
dent variable is the nominal money stock, whereas
under the alternative, the dependent variable is the
price level. Since the variance ofprices is less than
that of nominal money, one expects an equation
with prices as the dependent variable to have a
lower standard error. The models cannot be re-
arranged to have the same dependent variable, so
Table 2
Money Demand underVarying Policy Regimes
Unconstrained Unconstrained Constrained Constrained
Price Money Price Money
Adjustment Adjustment Adjustment Adjustment
Model Model Model Model
(79.10-82.07) (76.08-79.09, (79.10-82.07) (76.08-79.09,
82.08-83.08) 82.08-83.08)
Price Adjustment 0.0953 0.0236
Coefficient (1.925) (1.197)
Money Adjustment 0.0707 0.0739
Coefficient (4.50) (4.65)
Real Personal 0.353 1.155 1.096 1.096
Income (Elasticity) (1.41 ) (9.68) (11.70) (11.70)
Commercial Paper 0.006 - 0.182 - 0.171 - 0.171
Rate (Elasticity) (1.41 ) (7.54) (8.24) (8.24)
Change in I 0.184 0.192
Bank Loans (1.35) (1.38)
Constant 2.871 - 2.93 2.837 - 2.503
(1.62) (3.39) (3.85) (3.68)
RHOI 0.230 - 0.338 0.256 0.331
RH02 0.180 - 0.257 0.182 - 0.249
SEE" 0.003053 0.003087
I. 13 in Equation (5)
2. These standard errors refer to the full sample period and measure the ability ofthe combined models to explain the data.
25that it is not possible to set up a "nested" equation
that includes each model as a special case.
There is some weak evidence that the money-
adjustment specification provides a superior ex-
planation of the U.S. experience. The estimated
parameters appear to be more stable under this
specification. On the other hand, the empirical
results suggest that the estimates ofthe underlying
long-run parameters are not sensitive to the dyna-
mic structure chosen. This is a very useful result
since it implies that, at least in the long-run, predic-
tions ofthe effects ofchanges in the stock ofnomi-
nal money on income, prices and interest rates will
not be affected much by the adjustmentassumptions
made in estimating the money-demand relation.
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FOOTNOTES
1. David Laidler, "The Buffer Stock Notion in Monetary
Economics," 1983 HarryJohnson Lecture, April 12, 1983.
2. Thefact that agents holdthis buffer in theform ofmoney
rather than of other assets which yield interest is explained
bytheexistence oftransactionscosts of switchingbetween
money and these other assets.
3. John P. Judd and John L. Scadding, "Dynamic Adjust-
ment in the Demand for Money: Tests of Alternative
Hypotheses," Economic Review, Federal Reserve Bank of
San Francisco, (Fall 1982).
4. The variance of the monthly change in the logarithm of
prices (I.e. the monthly growth rate) over the period from
August 1976toAugust 1983 is6.30 x 10-6whereasthatof
the monthly change in the logarithm of nominal money is
3.17 x 10.-5 Thus nominal money was approximately five
times more variable than was the price level.
5. John P. Judd, "A Monthly Model ofthe Money and Bank
Loan Markets" Working Papers in Applied Economic The-
ory and Econometrics, No. 83-01, May 1983.
6. Foreach equation this proportion is computed as
1- [(RSS/n-k)/(TSS/n-1)]
where n is the number of observations, k is the number of
parameters estimated, RSS is the residual sum ofsquares
of each equation and TSS is the total sum ofsquares ofthe
monthly growth rate of the dependent variable in each
equation (I.e., prices and nominal money respectively).
7. An F-testofthis restriction cannot reject it atthe 5% level
of significance. The computed F-statistic is 1.72, compared
to a critical valueof3.13.